The El Segundo division of Douglas made its only genuine forays into developing and building carrier-based jet fighters for operations in the daytime in the 1950s with the F4D Skyray and F5D Skylancer, both of which were quite revolutionary among US Navy jet fighters in their wing planform. However, the end of the F5D program and the completion of production of the F4D did not entirely spell the end of the flirtation by Douglas' El Segundo division with air-to-air combat aircraft designs, despite the company’s preoccupation with production of airliners, attack aircraft, and military transports. Towards the end of the 1950s, Douglas toyed with the idea of a long-range interceptor designed to defend the US Navy’s aircraft carriers from Mach 2 capable aircraft, taking the world of long-range aerial interception into the realm of naval aviation. However, the concept of a subsonic fleet defense fighter by Douglas would end up being killed by a combination of both politics and the changing threat environment emanating from the Soviet Union.
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| An artist's concept of the Douglas F6D Missileer (D-766) in flight |
In 1957, the US Navy published detailed assessments indicating that the new F4H Phantom II supersonic jet fighter might not be capable of protecting aircraft carriers from enemy aircraft capable of Mach 2 and that a purpose-built subsonic interceptor would be needed to prevent attacks on large carriers by Mach 2 aircraft. To begin addressing this demand, a new long-range air-to-air missile, the XAAM-N-10 Eagle, was envisaged with mid-course and terminal homing guidance systems and the capability to shoot down enemy aircraft 130 miles (209 km) away, and Bendix and Douglas submitted proposals for the airframe of the Eagle missile, the latter submission designated D-742 by Douglas. In December 1958, Bendix was selected by the Navy to build the Eagle, which relied on a solid-fuel rocket booster with folding fins to reach Mach 3.5, and Grumman became the sub-contractor for development of the XAAM-N-10. By late November 1959, the US Navy announced the TS-151 requirement for a long-range fleet defense jet fighter armed with the Eagle missile and equipped with a Westinghouse AN/APG-81 pulse-doppler radar while flying at a loiter time of six hours over a distance of 150 miles (241 km). In response, Boeing, Douglas, Grumman, North American, McDonnell, and Vought submitted bids for the TS-151 competition, with the Douglas proposals being designated D-765, D-766, and D-767 by the company and the North American design featuring straight shoulder-mounted wings and two jet engines slung under the wings. Douglas had previously worked on a subsonic long-range interceptor project in May 1958 under the internal designation D-746, the weapon system based on the carriage of the losing Douglas bid for the XAAM-N-10 airframe contract having been designated D-745. The D-766 design had straight shoulder-mounted wings and horizontal stabilizers and two Pratt & Whitney TF30 turbofans in the wing roots, and it was 53 feet (16.15 meters) long with a wingspan of 70 feet (21.3 meters), a height of 10 feet 1 in (3.07 meters), a wing area of 630 square feet (59 m2), a gross weight of 50,000 lb (22,680 kg), a maximum takeoff weight of 60,000 lb (27,216 kg), and a top speed of 546 mph (879 km/h). The wings of the D-766 would have underwing pylons for six Eagle air-to-air missiles, three per wing, and the tricycle landing gear had twin wheels on each leg, all folding into the fuselage.
On July 21, 1960, the US Navy declared the Douglas D-766 the winner of the TS-151 competition, with the Vought V-434 submission achieving second place, and the D-766 was officially designated XF6D-1 and christened Missileer, with two prototypes ordered. The biggest complexity of the F6D Missileer was the fact that its pulse-doppler radar and air-to-air weaponry had to work in concert with the newly deployed Grumman W2F Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft (redesignated E-2 in 1962), given that the AEW system of the Hawkeye was capable of detecting threats at ranges beyond 230 miles (370 km) to assist the F6D in intercepting enemy aircraft and the pulse-doppler radar could cover areas over distances of 137 miles (220 km). Therefore, although development of the F6D was seen as likely to be low-cost and successful, the system as a whole was very risky and expensive. Additionally, some Navy officials had doubts about the need for a subsonic fleet defense interceptor, arguing that once the F6D Missileer fired its missiles, it would be completely unable to defend itself and would have to return to an aircraft carrier as quickly as possible to re-arm. By December 1960 outgoing Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates removed funding for the F6D from the FY 1962 defense budget, and even though Douglas in February 1961 made a last-minute plea to keep the Missileer project alive, newly sworn-in Defense Secretary Robert McNamara formally canceled the F6D program in favor having the Navy and US Air Force forge a joint requirement for a new fighter-bomber that became the TFX program, which led to the F-111 Aardvark. The Eagle AAM that would have armed the F6D also was cancelled without ever having reached the hardware phase, but some of its technologies would later find their way into the AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missile carried by the F-14 Tomcat. In any case, the fact that the USSR did not put much serious effort into developing supersonic aircraft that could attack the carriers from which the F6D would have operated further poured cold water on the idea of a long-range fleet defense interceptor.
References:
Buttler, T., 2007. American Secret Projects: Fighters and Interceptors 1945 to 1978. Hinckley, UK: Midland Publishing.
Thomason, T.H., 2008. U.S. Naval Air Superiority: Development of Shipborne Jet Fighters, 1943–1962. North Branch, MN: Specialty Press.
Wagner, R., 2004. American Combat Planes of the 20th Century: A Comprehensive Reference. Reno, Nevada: Jack Bacon & Co. ISBN 0-930083-17-2.
